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Abstract 
The use of belief functions has recently been advocated as an alternative to the use of probability 
functions in order to represent quantified beliefs. Such a proposal lacked justification. We present a 
set of requirements hat justify the use of belief functions. The assessment of the validity of these 
requirements provides a tool for assessing the relative value of normative models of subjective 
behaviors. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
To build a “thinking robot” can be seen as the ultimate aim of artificial intelligence. 
To be “viable” such a robot should be able to reason and act within an uncertainty 
riddled environment. Uncertainty assumes numerous forms [ 13,161 and usually induces 
“beliefs”, i.e., the graded dispositions that guide “our” behavior. If the robot is to hold 
such “beliefs”, then a mathematical model representing beliefs is needed. This paper 
develops such a model. Our approach is normative. The “robot’‘-the agent that holds 
the beliefs-henceforth called You, is an ideal rational subject. We propose requirements 
that should be satisfied by the beliefs held by such an agent. These requirements are 
satisfied if beliefs are quantified by belief functions [ 121. The derived model is the 
transferable belief model [ 151. 
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As far as we know, this is the first axiomatization that justifies the use of belief 
functions to represent quantified beliefs. Wong et al. [ 191 have proposed qualita- 
tive axioms for a belief ordering and shown that it can always be represented by 
belief functions, but they fail to show that only belief functions can represent such 
an ordering. Of course, using belief functions clashes with the current trend advo- 
cated by the Bayesian School that claims that quantified beliefs must be represented 
by probability functions. What makes our axiomatization interesting is that the analy- 
sis of the proposed requirements provides a tool for comparing competing normative 
models. 
After summarizing the necessary technical information, we present the proposed re- 
quirements together with a few illustrative examples by way of illustration. Proofs are 
omitted. ’ We focus essentially on the rationality constraints that underpin the require- 
ments and that really justify them. 
2. The credibility domain 
The aim of this paper is to develop the mathematical structure of a function Cr, 
temporarily called a credibility function that quantifies Your beliefs that the actual world 
belongs to such or such subset of possible worlds. Beliefs can equivalently be allocated 
to “propositions”, to the subsets of worlds that denote the propositions or to events. Our 
presentation is based on the possible worlds approach [ 1,111. 
The strength of the beliefs entertained by You at time t is defined relatively to a given 
evidential corpus (EC:), i.e., the set of evidence in Your mind at time t. This EC: is 
equivalent to the “background knowledge” used by the Bayesians, and intuitively just 
means “all You know”. Only one belief holder, You, is considered in this paper, and 
time t is unique except when belief revision is studied. 
2. I, The propositional space 
Let L: be a finite propositional language, supplemented by the tautology and the 
contradiction, denoted T and I, respectively, and closed under the usual Boolean con- 
nectives 1, v and A. Let a be the set of worlds that correspond to the interpretations 
of L and built so that no two worlds denote logically equivalent propositions. For any 
proposition X in L, let [IX] & 0 be the set of worlds identified by X (i.e., those worlds 
where X is true). 
Let R be a Boolean algebra of subsets of D (thus closed under union, intersection, 
complement, and containing 0 and 8). Let At(R) be the set of atoms of the algebra R, 
i.e., the non-empty elements of R whose intersection with any element of R is either 
themselves or the empty set. The atoms of R are the elements of a partition of a. When 
R is the power set 2O of a, the atoms of R are the singletons of 0. 
’ Proofs are presented in a Technical Report that can be obtained from the author. 
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We assume that among the worlds of D a particular one, denoted wa, corresponds 
to the actual world. You do not know at t which world is 00. You can only express 
Your beliefs at t that the actual world wa does or does not belong to various subsets of 
worlds. By definition the actual world we is an element of a. 
The domain of Your beliefs is assumed to be a Boolean algebra of subsets R of 
0. Indeed whenever You can express Your belief that wo belongs to a set A and 
to a set B, You can also express Your belief that wa belongs to their complement 
(relative to fin), union and intersection. We do not assume that R is 2”. Because 
of Your limited reasoning power, Your beliefs that result from Your evidential corpus 
at time t are not necessarily so detailed that every subset of 0 can be assigned a 
belief. In [ 143, we further examine the case where the credibility is defined only on 
a subalgebra R’ of a, in which case the belief holder is not even sure that wa is 
an element of fl’. For simplicity’s sake, that particular case will not be considered 
here. 
We call 0 the frame of discernment (the frame for short). We call the pair (0, ‘R) 
a propositional space. 
2.2. Doxastic equivalence 
We now introduce the concept of doxastic equivalence, i.e., equivalence relative to 
the evidential corpus EC:. As an example, suppose You want to decide whether to go 
to a movie or stay at home tonight. You have decided to toss a coin, if it is heads, You 
will go to the movie, and if it is tails, You will stay at home. (These are the pieces of 
evidence in EC:.) Then “heads” and “going to the movie” are doxastically equivalent 
as they share the same truth status given what You know at t. Of course, they are 
not logically equivalent [ 71. Logical equivalence implies doxastic equivalence, not the 
reverse. 
Formally, in propositional logic, two propositions p and q defined on rS are logically 
equivalent iff I[pI] = [q]. They are doxastically equivalent (for You at t, i.e., given EC:) 
iff the sets of worlds IIpjj and [q] that denote them share the same worlds among those 
in [ECr~, i.e., [EC:]] n 51 = [EC;] rl [q], where [EC;] denotes the set of worlds where 
all the propositions deduced on L from EC; are true. 
Doxastic equivalence under EC: is denoted by: [[PI =Ec~ [q]. 
2.3. Change in the evidential corpus 
A piece of evidence is defined here as a proposition that You will accept as true once 
You learn it. Adding a piece of evidence Ev to Your evidential corpus EC: leads to a 
new evidential corpus, denoted EC: U {Ev}. The piece of evidence REV is the negation 
of the piece of evidence Ev, i.e., the proposition that would characterize Ev is accepted 
as false. By construction, [Ev] n [[REV] = 8, and ECf’ U {Ev U -Ev} = EC:. The last 
equality results from the fact that Ev U REV is a tautology and adding a tautology to an 
evidential corpus will leave it unchanged. 
We say that Ev is compatible with EC: if [EC:] n [EvI] Z 0. 
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2.4. Belief functions 
We will derive that quantified beliefs are represented by “belief functions” [ 121. 
Given a propositional space (a, R), a belief function is a function be1 from R to [ 0, 1 ] 
such that: 
(1) bel(0) = 0, 
(2) forallAt,Az ,..., A,E’R, 
bel( Al U A2 U . . . U A,) 2 c bel( Ai) - c bel( Ai n Al) - . . . 
-I(-l)“bel(A;:A2”...“A,). 
(1) 
Usually, bel(0) = 1 is also assumed. It can be ignored and we will only require that 
bel(D) 6 1. 
3. Axiomatic justification for the use of belief functions 
Let .F denote the set of functions that could be used to quantify someone’s beliefs 
and let us call “credibility functions” the elements of F. Initially, credibility functions 
can be any set function. We then introduce requirements that we feel any measure of 
belief should satisfy. Each requirement increasingly limits 3, up to the point where .F 
reduces itself to the set of belief functions. Even though probability functions are special 
cases of belief functions, the family of probability functions is not expressive enough to 
satisfy all requirements (see Section 3.5). 
3.1. The credibility function 
The first requirement states that beliefs are pointwise valued, non-negative and mono- 
tone for inclusion. 
Requirement 1. Let (n, R) be a propositional space. Your beliefs allocated to the 
elements of R are quantified by a pointwise function Cr : R --+ [0, 11, where Cr(@) = 
0, and Cr is monotone for inclusion, i.e., for all A, B E R, if A C B, then 0(A) 6 
Cr(B). 
The triple (0, R, Cr) is called a credibility space. As Cr is induced by EC:, the 
belief state of You at t is fully described by (0, R, Cr, EC:) and we call that quadruple 
a belief state. 
That Cr is a pointwise function is not without consequence as it leads to rejecting be- 
lief representations based on interval valued probabilities or sets of probability functions 
[ 8-10,17,18]. 
We introduce the strong but obvious requirement that propositions doxastically equiv- 
alent for You at t receive the same beliefs [ 71. 
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Requirement 2 (Zhzzstic consistency). Let ( 0, Ri, Cq), i = 1,2, be two credibility 
spaces induced by the same EC:. Let At E RI, A2 E R2. 
If AI =Ec; AZ, then Cq (Al) = Crz(A2). 
Requirement 2 implies that those subsets of n that belong to both algebras will receive 
the same belief: indeed the propositions that denote them are doxastically equivalent. 
Hence the belief given to a subset of D does not depend on the structure of the algebra 
to which the subset belongs. 
3.2. Convexity of the set of credibility functions 
We first accept that probability functions belong to 7. This could be either directly 
assumed, or equivalently derived from the Hacking frequency principle that claims: 
If Chance(X) = p, then Belief(X) = p 
where Chance corresponds to objective probability, and Belief to Cr. 
Requirement 3. Probability functions are credibility functions. 
We then proceed by showing that the linear combination of two credibility functions 
is a credibility function. 
Example 1 (The horse race). Suppose a horse race involving three horses: Allan, 
Blues and Carol. Tomorrow at 7 AM, it will be decided depending on the outcome 
of a coin tossing experiment, if the race will be run at 10 AM or 4 PM. Let (Y be 
the probability that the race is run at 10 AM. The time of the race influences Your 
beliefs about which horse will win. Let Crl and Cr2 be the credibility functions that 
describe Your beliefs about which horse will win if the race is run at 10 AM or at 
4 PM, respectively. You must buy a ticket now. Let Cr12 be the credibility function 
that describes Your beliefs held by now about the winner. We essentially assume that 
Cri2(A) for A 2 {Allan,Blues,Carol} depends only on Crl (A), Cr2( A) and LY. The 
next requirement formalizes this constraint. 
Requirement 4. Let an evidential corpus be EC: and the pieces of evidence be Evl 
and Ev2 where Ev2 = ~Evl, and where both are compatible with EC:. Let LY be the 
probability that You learn Evl and 1 - a the probability that You learn Ev2. Let Crl, 
Cr;? and Cr12 be the credibility functions that represent Your beliefs on a propositional 
space ( 0, R) as induced by EC: U {Evl }, EC: U {EVA}, and EC;, respectively. 
Then there exists a function F : [ 0, 1 ] 3 4 [ 0, 1 ] such that for all A E 72, 
where F, (x, y) is continuous in (x, y) E [ 0, 1 ] 2, strictly monotone for both components 
and idempotent ( Fa(x, x) = x). 
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Under Requirements 1, 3 and 4, we prove that: 
Crtz(A) = aCq(A) + (1 - cr)Cr~(A) for all A E 72. (2) 
Thus F is a convex set, a property shared by subjective probability functions and belief 
functions, but neither by the set of possibility nor by the set of necessity measures. Hence 
Requirements 3 and 4 eliminate possibility and necessity measures for representing 
beliefs. 
3.3. Uninformative changes of I2 
Example 2 (The killer’s nationality). Suppose a person was murdered. Let Cro repre- 
sent Your beliefs that the killer (k) is English, German, French or Italian. Cro is defined 
on the subsets of {E, G, E I}. We consider how Cro will be adapted when the domain of 
Your belief is changed. Two transformations are considered: coarsening and refinement. 
In the first case, suppose French and Italian are grouped into the set “Mediterranean”. 
The new space {E, G, M} is a coarsening of the initial space. In the second case, sup- 
pose the set “French” is partitioned into two subsets, the sets “FrenchTuc” (F7’) and 
“FrenchPi? (FP) . The new space {E, G, FT, FP, I} is a refinement of the initial space. 
These transformations of the frames on which Your beliefs are defined are said to be 
“uninformative” in as much as Your evidential corpus EC: is unchanged for what con- 
cerns Your beliefs about the killer’s nationality. To change the granularity of the frames 
does not modify Your beliefs for those propositions that are doxastically equivalent. 
Let Crl and Cr;! represent Your belief on {E, G, M} and {E, G, FT, FP,I}, respec- 
tively. By doxastic consistency, Crl (E) = Cro( E) , Cq (M) = Cro( F U I), etc. and in 
fact Cq is entirely defined from Cro. Identically, Cr2( E) = Cro( E), Crz(FT U FP) = 
Cro( F), etc. but some values of Cr2 are not derivable from Cro by doxastic consis- 
tency: this is the case for Cr2 (FT) , Cr2( FT U E) , . . . . Hence extra requirements will be 
introduced. 
Formally, we have the next definitions. 
Definition (Coarsening). Let (0, ‘A!) be a propositional space. A coarsening C is a 
mapping from R to R”, where 72” is an algebra also defined on 0, such that one or 
several atoms of R are mapped into one atom of 72” and each atom of 72 is mapped 
into one and only one atom of 72”. 
Definition (Rejinement). Let (0, R) be a propositional space. A refinement R is a 
mapping from R to R’ where R’ is an algebra on 0’ such that each atom of R is 
mapped into one or several atoms of R’ and each atom of R’ is derived from one and 
only one atom of R. Let R(A) be the image of A E R in R’, and let R(Q)) = 8. 
The nature of the frames 0 and a’ is irrelevant to our presentation. The only important 
components are the algebras. In practice, we can always redefine fi and 0’ such that 
the resulting frames are equal. 
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Coarsenings and refinements are called uninformative if they do not modify the 
evidential corpus EC: held by You at t. Uninformative change fits in with the idea 
that only the structure of the algebra on which beliefs are held is modified; no further 
information is added to the evidential corpus. 
The uninformative nature of the changes is formalized in the next requirement that 
states that the credibility function induced by such mappings from an initial credibility 
function Cr depends only on Cr and the mapping. 
Requirement 5. Let (a, R, Cr, EC:) be a belief state. Let R be a refinement from 
(0, R) to (0, R’) and let C be a coarsening from (a, R) to (0,7X”). Let the belief 
states be (0, R’, Cr’, EC;) and (0, R”, Cr”, EC;). Then Cr’ and CI” are completely 
determined by Cr and by R and C, respectively. So there are functions g and h such 
that: 
Cr’=g(Cr,R) and Cr/‘=h(Cr,C). 
3.3.1. Uninformative coarsening 
The derivation of the nature of the h transformation is immediate as illustrated in 
Example 2. The only difference between 0” and Cr is that Cr provides more detailed 
information on G than CJ’. Indeed Cr describes a belief over an algebra ‘R whose 
granularity is finer. The next theorem is proved by the direct application of the doxastic 
consistency requirement. 
Theorem 1. Let (a, R”, Ct”, EC:) be the belief state derived from the belief state 
(a, R, Cr, EC:) by the uninformative coarsening C from (Q, R) to (0, IT!“). Given 
Requirements 1, 2 and 5, 
Cr”(A) = Cr(C-‘(A)) for all A E R” (3) 
where C- ’ (A) denotes the union of the atoms of R which are mapped by C into an 
atom of A. 
3.3.2. Uninformative refinement 
In Requirement 5, some of the values of Cl’ are derived by the direct application of 
the doxastic consistency requirement. But this does not work for the elements of R’ 
that are not the image of some elements of R under R. They will be deduced once we 
study the conditioning process to which we now turn our attention. We only need one 
requirement: it states that if an atom of R is refined into a very large number of new 
atoms in R’ by the refinement R, then the credibility given to this new atoms should be 
very small. 
Requirement 6. Let ( 0, R,,, Cr,, EC:) be the belief state derived from the belief state 
(a, R, Cr, EC:) by the uninformative refinement R, from (0, R) to (0, R,), where 
R, is so defined that it refines a given atom w of R into n atoms of 73,. Let w, be one 
of the atoms of R, that belongs to R,(o). Then: 
lim Cr,(w,) =O. 
,7--t03 
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3.4. Informative changes of R: conditioning 
Let EC: be the evidential corpus held by You at time t and let (0, R, Cr, EC:) be 
Your belief state. Suppose You revise EC: by adding to it the piece of evidence EvA 
where EVA is the proposition: “all worlds in x C Q are impossible”. How do You revise 
Your beliefs, hence Cr, after adding EVA to EC;? For simplicity’s sake, we assume 
that EvA is compatible with EC:. Generalization for EvA not compatible with EC: is 
possible but useless here. The fact that EVA is compatible with EC: implies that we 
are restricting ourselves to the expansion process [4], i.e., to the conditioning process 
usually described in probability theory. 
Let CrA be the credibility function (qualified as conditional) that results from the 
adjunction of EVA to EC:. It is postulated that CrA is completely determined by the 
credibility function Cr based on EC,’ and by A. 
Requirement 7 (Markovian axiom). Let the belief state be (0, R, 15-0, ECo) . For A E 
72, let EVA be a piece of evidence compatible with ECo. Let ECA = EC0 U {EvA} be the 
evidential corpus obtained by adding EVA to ECo. Let (a, R, CrA, ECA) be the belief 
state after EVA has been added to ECo. It is assumed that CrA is completely determined 
by Cro and A. 
To derive the conditioning process, we use the idea of iterated conditioning. Let 
A, B C R, and the three pieces of evidence EVA, EVB and EVA~B. Suppose You learn 
( 1) EVA and then EVB, or (2) EVB and then EVA, or (3) directly Ev,Q-,B. In order to 
satisfy doxastic consistency, the final conditional credibility functions must be the same 
in the three cases. This is obtained by accepting that the order with which pieces of 
evidence are taken into consideration is irrelevant. Furthermore, the doxastic consistency 
requirement allows us also to prove that the conditional credibility function Cr,.$ depends 
only on a few terms of Cr. 
Theorem 2. Let the belief state be (0, R, Cr, EC:). For A E R, let EVA be a piece of 
evidence compatible with EC:. Let (a, R, Cr.4, EC: U {EVA}) be the new belief state 
obtained after conditioning the previous belief state on EVA. Then CrA satis$es: 
(1) CrA(B) =OforallBCx, BER, 
(2) CrA(B) = CrA(B fl A) for all B E R, 
and there is a function f such that for all B E R, 
(3) CrA(B) = f(Cr(BnA),Cr(BflA),Cr(A),Cr(A),Cr(BU;;i),Cr(BUA), 
MO)). 
We introduce the principle of doxastic stability through Example 2. 
Example 2 (Continued). Consider the refinement of Example 2. Let Cro and Cr2 de- 
note the credibility function defined on {E, G, E I} and {E, G, FT, FP, I}, respectively. 
Two types of conditionings, called generic and factual conditionings, can be consid- 
ered [ 31. The first results from an information relative to a set of worlds to which 
the actual world belongs, the second from an information relative to the actual world 
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itself. For the generic conditioning, suppose You learn that there was no FrenchTuc 
(FT) at the place where the killing occurred. For the factual conditioning, suppose You 
had a perfect witness who can only recognize if someone is FT or not. The witness 
saw the killer, and states that the killer is not FT. Are these two types of conditioning 
equivalent? As far as You are concerned, they are. Both state that the killer is not 
FT. For the factual conditioning, the situation would have been different if the killer 
had been randomly selected from a population and You had learned that the killer 
was not FT, a good reason for such an event being that the killer is not French, and 
the resulting probabilistic analysis would be appropriate. Here we are not concerned 
with a randomly selected killer, but with one killer. And the two pieces of condition- 
ing information are equivalent as far as Your beliefs about the killer’s nationality are 
concerned. 
Once You know that the killer is not a FrenchTuc, “the killer is French’ and “the 
killer is FrenchPic” are doxastically equivalent. Similarly, Your belief that the killer is 
German was not affected by the refinement of the French into FP and FT: neither was 
it affected by the knowledge that the killer was not FT. So: CrnOt ,GT(G) = Cr2(G) = 
Cro(G>. 
Similarly, that the killer is “German or FrenchPic” is doxastically equivalent to 
the fact that the killer is “German or French” (as French and FrenchPic are doxas- 
tically equivalent once You know the killer is not FrenchTuc) So: Crnot m( {G, FP}) = 
Co({G, F}) = Cro({G,F}). 
These equalities are natural but must nevertheless be assumed. Formally, we have the 
next requirement. 
Requirement 8 (Doxastic stability). Let the belief state be (0, R, Cr,ECa). Let R be 
an uninformative refinement from R to R’. Let w be an atom of R, and R(w) = A U B 
where A n B = 8, A # 0, B # 8. Let Evg be the piece of evidence that states that 
all atoms in B are impossible and let EC, = EC0 U {EvF}, so R(Z) U A =EC, 0. 
Then under EC,, R(X) fl B and R(X) are doxastically equivalent for every X in R: 
R(X) nB=EC, R(X). 
Gardenfors [ 41 suggests two compelling properties for probabilistic revision functions: 
homomorphism and preservation, whose meanings are illustrated hereafter. 
Example 1 (Continued). In the horse race example, suppose that You learn that Carol 
is a sure loser. You can derive the conditional credibility function either directly from 
the combined credibility function Cr12 or from the linear combination of the individual 
credibility functions 0-t and 02. This requirement would have been satisfied in proba- 
bility theory if probabilities had not been normalized, i.e., if the axiom P( f2) = 1 were 
abandoned, and the Bayesian conditioning rule were P (Al B) = P( A n B) instead of 
P(A n B)/P(B). 
Requirement 9 (homomorphism) . If Cr = pCr’ + ( 1 - p) Cj’, p E [ 0, 11, then CrA = 
pCra + ( 1 - p) 0” for any A E R. 
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The preservation requirement asserts essentially that a proposition as much believed 
as a tautology will be as believed as the conditioning proposition after conditioning. 
Example 1 (Continued). Consider the horse race example involving four horses: Al- 
lan, Blues, Carol and Daisy. Suppose You learn that Daisy is a sure loser. Then 
{Allan, Blues, Carol} and {Allan, Blues, Carol, Daisy} are doxastically equivalent, hence 
Cr( {Allan, Blues, Carol}) = Cr( {Allan, Blues, Carol, Daisy}). 
Then if You also learn that Carol is a sure loser, then {Allan, Blue, Carol}, {Allan, Blue} 
and {Allan, Blue, Daisy} are doxastically equivalent, hence 
Cl;lot-Carot ({Allan, Blues, Carol}) = Cr”,t_caroi( {Allan, Blues, Daisy}). 
Furthermore, once I know that Daisy is a sure loser, no new information about other 
sure losers could change this knowledge, hence Cr(Daisy) was zero and cannot become 
positive by learning that Carol is a sure loser. 
Requirement 10 (Presewation). If Cr(B) = Cr( a), then Cr, (B) = CrA (A) for any 
A, B E 72, and if Cr( B) = Cr( a) and Cr(B) = 0, then Cr, (3) = 0 for any A, B E 72. 
Given Requirements l-10, we can establish the exact mathematical relations that 
represent the impact of both the conditioning and the coarsening processes. 
Theorem 3. Let the belief state be (0, ‘R, Cr, EC). Let R be an uninformative refinement 
from ( K&R) to (a, 72’). Let Cr’ be the credibility function derived from Cr on R’ by 
R. For A E R, let CrA be the conditional credibility function induced from Cr by the 
evidence EVA. The only solutions for the coarsening and conditioning processes that 
satisfy Requirements 1- 10 are respectively: 
Cr’(X) = y: ggcxWY) for all X in R’, 
(4) 
CrA(B) =Cr(BUA) -cr(x) forA,BER. 
3.5. Why are probability functions and plausibility functions inadequate? 
Before going on to prove that all credibility functions are belief functions, we consider 
some of the consequences of Requirements l-10, and in particular why probability 
functions and plausibility functions are inadequate to represent quantified beliefs. 
To show that probability functions are not adequate, we consider the problem of iter- 
ated uninformative refinements. As an illustrative example, take & = {a, b}, 01 = 
{a, bt, bz}, and 02 = {a, bl, 621, b22). Let RI be a refinement from (&,2@‘) to 
(01,2”l) such that RI (a) = {u} and RI(~) = {bl, b2). Let R2 be a refinement from 
(K4,2”‘) to (fl~,2~~) such that R2(a) = {a}, R2(bl) = {bl} and Rz(b2) = (b21,bz). 
Let the belief state be (a, 2 @I Cro, ECo). Let Crl (Cr2) be the credibility function ,
induced from Cro ( Crl ) on 2”l (2@) by the uninformative refinement RI (R2). 
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Consider the refinement Rt2 from (0,2’) to (fi~,2’~) such that R12(a) = {a}, 
R12(b) = {h,b21,b22)> and let Cr12 be the credibility function induced from Cro on 
2@ by the uninformative refinement Rt2. Rt2 is nothing but the result of combining RI 
with R2. By the doxastic consistency requirement, 0-2 = Cr12. 
In order to achieve such an equality in probability theory, we need to know how 
Cro( b) is distributed among bl and b2, and how Crl (b2) is distributed among b21 and 
b22. That knowledge contradicts the Markovian requirement that states that Cq should 
depend only on Cro and RI, not on some extra information like the distributions of 
Cro( b) between bl and b2. The Markovian requirement can only be satisfied if Cro( b) 
is equally distributed between bl and b2, in which case Cq (b2) should also be equally 
distributed between b2l and b22. Thus Cr2( bzl) would be equal to Cro(b)/4. The same 
rule applied to Cr12, using Ri2, implies that Crlz(b21) = Cro( b)/3, hence Cr12 f 
Crz, an inequality that contradicts the doxastic consistency requirement. Hence equi- 
repartition cannot be defended. So probability functions are not adequate to represent 
beliefs once iterated uninformative refinements are applied. 
The preservation requirement is not satisfied by plausibility functions, the dual of 
the belief functions. This rejection seems adequate because we feel that Cr should 
behave like the modality used to represent categorical beliefs, i.e., the “box” operator 
encountered in doxastic logic. Using plausibility functions to represent quantified beliefs 
would be equivalent to representing categorical beliefs by the “diamond” operator. Of 
course, such an interpretation of categorical “belief’ could be defended. The question is 
in defining what is meant by beliefs: we follow the classical interpretation described in 
doxastic logic [ 51. 
In conclusion, probability functions are not expressive enough to satisfy our require- 
ments, and plausibility functions do not cover our interpretation of the belief modality. 
3.6. Credibility functions are belief functions 
That belief functions satisfy all Requirements l-10 is immediate. The problem is 
to prove the reverse. We prove it by studying the concept of deconditionalization, i.e., 
the inverse of the conditioning process, and adding a final requirement. Suppose You 
had some initial credibility function Cr defined on R and You had conditioned it on 
Evx for X E R, which resulted in the credibility function Crx. Then You learn that 
the conditioning on EVX was inappropriate, i.e., that all the reasons that lead You to 
condition on Evx were unjustified. You want to erase the impact of EVX from Crx 
and rebuild a credibility function Cr from which Crx could have been obtained by its 
conditioning on Evx. 
Formally, let (a, R) be a propositional space. Let Cr be the set of credibility functions 
defined on R. For X E R, let Crx be the set of conditional credibility functions obtained 
by conditioning the elements of Cr on EVX by Eq. (4). The impact of conditioning the 
elements of Cr on X can be described by an operator SX : Cr ---f Crx such that: 
Crx = SX 0 Cr for all Cr E Cr. 
SX is a linear operator and is uniquely represented by a matrix operator [ 61. 
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Consider now the deconditioning operators. The matrix Sx is a singular matrix, so 
it admits only generalized inverses. Let Si be such an operator. S; is a generalized 
inverse of Sx and satisfies: 
sxos,- os,y=sx. 
The relation translates the idea that re-conditioning after deconditioning annihilates the 
effect of the deconditioning. Besides Si is also idempotent: 
s,- 0s; = s;. 
Indeed, deconditioning twice has the same impact as deconditioning once. 
Given Sx, there are many operators SF satisfying Eqs. (5) and (6). Let S; be the 
set of such deconditioning operators. 
Example 3. In order to explain the origin of the next requirement, suppose that Crx 
quantifies Your beliefs over R based on an evidential corpus EC: that contains the 
conditioning evidence EVX for X E R. You then learn that the evidence EVX was 
unjustified and its impact must be erased. Which operator SF should You use? Suppose 
another agent You* has some opinion about which operator Si E ST is to be used by 
You. The opinion of You* is represented by a credibility over SF. Suppose You* is 
sure about which S; E SF should be used by You to decondition Crx. Suppose You 
had no a priori opinion about which operator is appropriate and You trust in You*. So 
You accept the opinion of You* that the appropriate operator is indeed S& and You use 
S& to decondition 0~. Of course, the result must be a credibility function over R. We 
want You* to be able to choose SF* independently of the value Crx representing Your 
belief over 72. Thus, for every Crx and every S; E ST, SF o Crx must be a credibility 
function. This requirement is sufficient to prove that the credibility functions are belief 
functions. If Cr is not a belief function, then it is always possible to find an S; so that 
S; o Crx allocates negative beliefs to some elements of 72. 
The next requirement just formalizes the requirement detailed in Example 3. 
Requirement 11. Let (0, R) be a propositional space. Let Cr be the set of credibility 
functions defined on R. For X E R, let Crx be the set of conditional credibility functions 
defined on R after conditioning the credibility functions in Cr on the evidence EVX. Let 
SF be the set of operators deconditioning the elements of Crx on EVX. For every Si in 
SF and every Crx in Crx, one has: 
Si 0 Crx E Cr. 
Requirements l-l 1 imply that credibility functions are belief functions. 
Theorem 4. Every function that satisfzes Requirements l-l 1 is a belief unction. 
This concludes our task. 
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4. Conclusions 
In conclusion, we have justified the use of belief functions to represent quantified 
beliefs. The model we obtain corresponds to the transferable belief model, i.e., a model 
for the representation of beliefs based on belief functions and developed independently 
of any probabilistic assumption. This is to be contrasted with Dempster’s model [ 21 that 
is also based on belief functions, but it is strongly linked to some underlying probability 
function. Indeed, the belief function derived within Dempster’s model on some given 
space Y results from a one-to-many mapping between a space X and the space Y, and the 
existence of a probability measure on X. This probability measure imposes constraints 
that we have not included in our modelization. 
Similar reasons hold for the random sets interpretation of belief functions. The model 
we develop does not require any idea of subjective probability. It is derived directly 
from general rationality principles unrelated to some underlying probability function, as 
is the case with the transferable belief model. 
The value of the model we derive for representing quantified beliefs can be assessed 
by analyzing the validity of each requirement and assessing their adequacy. No objective 
test seems to exist to evaluate normative models for quantified beliefs. Hence the interest 
of the axiomatic justification we propose. 
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